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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO
STATE OF IDAHO, )
) NO. 44490
Plaintiff-Respondent, )
) CANYON COUNTY NO. CR 2012-15572
v. )
)




STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
Kimberly Hyatt contends the district court erred when it denied her motion to
correct an illegal sentence pursuant to I.C.R. 35(a) (hereinafter,  Rule  35(a)).   She
asserts that the district court’s order – that, if Ms. Hyatt were not placed in the
therapeutic community rider program, the district court would relinquish jurisdiction –
was not an order within the district court’s authority to order, and therefore, rendered her
whole sentence illegal.  In that case, this Court should reverse the order denying
Ms. Hyatt’s Rule 35(a) motion and remand this case for further proceedings.
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Statement of the Facts & Course of Proceedings
Ms. Hyatt initially pled guilty to three counts of delivery of a controlled substance.
(Supp. R., pp.45-47.)1  The district court imposed concurrent, unified sentences of
twenty years, with eight years fixed, on each charge and the district court retained
jurisdiction.  (Supp. R., p.46.)  Ms. Hyatt was ultimately placed in the therapeutic
community rider program.  (See R., p.10.)  However, based, at least in part, on her
performance in that program, the rider staff recommended the district court relinquish
jurisdiction, which the district court did.  (See R., pp.10, 68-69; Supp. R., pp.63-64.)
Ms. Hyatt filed a motion pursuant to I.C.R. 35(b) requesting the district court reconsider
that decision or grant her leniency, which the district court also denied.  (Supp.
R., pp.66-67, 77-79.)  The Court of Appeals affirmed the order denying Ms. Hyatt’s
motion for leniency. State v. Hyatt, 2014 Unpublished Opinion No. 546, 2014 WL
2553727, *1 (Ct. App. 2014)
Thereafter, Ms. Hyatt filed a pro se motion pursuant to Rule 35(a), in which she
argued, inter alia, her sentence was illegal because the district court had included an
order to the effect that, “if the defendant is not placed in the Therapeutic Community this
court shall be immediately notified as it will then relinquish jurisdiction.”  (R., p.10;
accord. Supp. R., p.47.)  Pursuant to her motion, the district court appointed counsel to
represent Ms. Hyatt on this claim.  (R., pp.17-20, 35.)  Counsel clarified her argument
was that, because I.C. § 19-2604(1) assigns the power to decide which programming
should be required of an inmate to the board of correction, and because the district
1 The Supreme Court ordered the transcripts and record prepared in Ms. Hyatt’s
previous appeal in this matter, Supreme Court Docket Number 41527, to be augmented
to the record in this case.  (R., p.106.)  References thereto will be identified as “Supp.”
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court’s order “effectively mandated placement into the program,” the district court’s
order violated I.C. § 19-2601(4), making her sentence illegal.  (R., pp.66-67.)
The district court denied that motion,2 explaining the sentencing court’s order
was “simply a condition precedent to the Court retaining jurisdiction.  If the Department
chose to put the defendant into a different program, it was entitled to do so, but in such
an instance, the Court would make a different decision with regard to execution of the
sentence.”  (R., pp.71-72.)  As such, the district court concluded the sentencing court
had not exceeded its authority under I.C. § 19-2601(4), and therefore, the sentence was
not illegal.  (R., p.72.)  Ms. Hyatt filed a notice of appeal timely from the order denying
her Rule 35(a) motion.  (R., pp.74-83.)
ISSUE
Whether the district court erred by denying Ms. Hyatt’s Rule 35(a) motion to correct an
illegal sentence.
ARGUMENT
The District Court Erred By Denying Ms. Hyatt’s Rule 35(a) Motion To Correct An Illegal
Sentence
A motion to correct an illegal sentence may be brought at any time.  I.C.R. 35(a).
In order to merit relief under that rule, the defendant must show the sentence is illegal
from the face of the record. State v. Clements, 148 Idaho 82, 86 (2009).  That means a
motion under Rule 35(a) cannot ask the district court to reexamine the underlying facts.
Id.  Rather, it only allows the district court to evaluate the basic public records and the
2 The district court judge who ruled on Ms. Hyatt’s Rule 35(a) motion was not the same
judge who imposed her sentence.  (Compare R., p.72, with Exhibits, p.576.)
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language of relevant statutes to determine whether the sentence set out in the basic
public records contradicts the language of the relevant statutes. Id. (explaining the
decision in State v. Kerrigan, 143 Idaho 185 (2006)).
Ms. Hyatt contends the order in the judgment of conviction – that “if the
defendant is not placed in the therapeutic community this Court shall be immediately
notified as it will then relinquish jurisdiction” (Supp. R., p.47) – conflicted with the
language of I.C. § 19-2601(4), and so, her sentence is illegal from the face of the
record.  (See R., pp.66-67.)  Idaho Code § 19-2601(4) allows the district court to
“[s]uspend the execution of judgment at any time during the first three hundred sixty-five
(365) days of a sentence to the custody of the state board of correction,” and retain
jurisdiction over the case during that time.   I.C. § 19-2601(4).   However, “during the
period of retained jurisdiction, the state board of correction shall be responsible for
determining the placement of the prison and such education, programming and
treatment as it determines appropriate.” Id.
The Idaho Supreme Court examined a similar situation in State v. Reese, 98
Idaho 347 (1977).  In that case, the district court imposed sentence on the defendant
and then, in a supplemental order, required he “be held in the mental medical facility at
the Idaho State Correctional Institution; it further required that the trial court be advised
prior to Reese’s transfer from the facility.” Id. at 348.  The Supreme Court vacated that
supplemental order because it exceeded the scope of the district court’s authority. Id. at
348.  The Supreme Court explained:  “Certainly, the court’s recommendations as to the
placement of a prisoner for treatment are entitled to great weight; the legislature,
however, has seen fit to rest the final discretion for this decision with the administration
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of the prison.” Id. at 348-49 (citing I.C. § 66-1306).  Despite vacating the supplemental
order, the Supreme Court nevertheless affirmed the rest of the sentence, which was
within the maximum allowed by statute. Id.
Mindful that, in Reese, the unlawful order was vacated without invalidating the
rest of the sentence, Ms. Hyatt maintains the order effectively mandating that she
participate in the therapeutic community rider program (which was unlawful under
I.C. § 19-2601(4) for the same reasons the supplemental order in Reese was unlawful
under I.C. § 66-1306), makes her entire sentence illegal from the face of the record, and
thus, should merit relief pursuant to Rule 35(a).  In that case, the district court’s order
denying her Rule 35(a) motion was error.
CONCLUSION
Ms. Hyatt respectfully requests that this Court reverse the order denying her Rule
35(a) motion and remand this case for further proceedings.
DATED this 2nd day of February, 2017.
__________/s/_______________
BRIAN R. DICKSON
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender
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